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THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEt
BERNARD SCHWARTZtt
One concerned with administrative law appreciates the pertinency
of North's famous statement about legal history which is reproduced on
the title page of Holdsworth: "To say truth, although it is not necessary
for counsel to know what the history of a point is, but to know how it
now stands resolved, yet it is a wonderful accomplishment, and, without
it, a lawyer cannot be accounted learned in the law."
The present crisis of the administrative process in this country
makes it particularly appropriate that we look at the administrative agency
in the perspective of history, for it is erroneous to assume that adminis-
trative law is something entirely new in our system. On the contrary,
what we have been seeing in our own day has been a renaissance of ad-
ministrative justice of the type which prevailed in the common-law world
in Tudor and Stuart times. Then, too, the law proved not wholly ade-
quate to meet the problems posed by changing economic and social condi-
tions. As in our time, a number of executive tribunals were created to
deal with the situation.
Before we can look to the lessons of history in this field, however,
a word must be said about the current crisis in the administrative agen-
cies. In March 1940, James M. Landis, then Dean of the Harvard Law
School, delivered a noted public lecture on "Crucial Issues in Adminis-
trative Law. 1 In it, he dealt with what he considered the principal prob-
lems posed by the operation of administrative agencies and especially with
those dealt with in the highly controversial Walter-Logan bill, then pend-
ing before the Congress. Today, some twenty years later, the federal
agencies are again embroiled in public debate, this time as the result of
congressional investigation. Throughout the country there has been
articulated a growing concern over the manner in which those agencies
t Paper delivered at the New York Conference of the American Society for Legal
History held at New York Law School October 24, 1960.
"t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. 53 HARv. L. REv. 1077 (1940).
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function. To understand such concern, we must look to the place of ad-
ministrative justice in our system and the reasons behind its recent
rebirth.
I. PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Despite the vast concern articulated in recent years over exercises of
administrative authority, it is surprising that there have been practically
no serious reconsiderations of the role of administrative justice as such.
Investigations and efforts at reform have been concerned almost entirely
with the procedural aspects of administrative law. Little, if any, real
scholarly attention has been paid to the question of whether administra-
tive justice in its present form is still actually appropriate under present-
day circumstances. Practically all students of our administrative law
agree that the growth of American administrative justice has been hap-
hazard. That may be an inevitable concomitant of any newly developing
system of social control, but there comes a time in such development
when the early disorder must give way to a period of synthesis and sys-
tematization. The role of administrative justice should be re-examined
in the light of the more than half a century of experience that the Fed-
eral Government has had with the modern administrative process. Such
re-examination must focus upon the proper division of judicial authority
as between courts and administrative agencies.
To the Anglo-American lawyer there is a basic difference between a
court and an administrative agency. A court, to his way of thinking, is
an organ "discharging judicial power with all the implications of the
judicial function in our constitutional scheme."2 An organ characterized
as administrative stands on a different footing. As was aptly pointed
out by an eminent English judge, a court is ill-fitted for the determina-
tion of the type of dispute which may be conferred upon an administra-
tive body.
Certain types of questions are not so suitable for decision by
courts of law as by a different type of tribunal. A court of
law must necessarily be guided by precedent. Its functions are
first to ascertain the facts and then to apply the law to the facts
as ascertained. In applying the law it must be guided by pre-
vious decisions. If it does not do this the law becomes chaotic.
The whole tradition and practice of legal administration makes
it extremely difficult for the judges to administer a law by
2. See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 604 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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which the tribunal is to grant or withhold rights according as
they think it just or reasonable to do so.'
The advantages of decision by administrative organs-directness,
expedition, freedom from the bonds of purely technical rules, and the
consequent ability to give effect to the legislatively expressed policy 4--
can only be bought at the cost of many of the traditional checks which
obtain upon courts. Certainty and predictability, the technique of deci-
sion according to authoritative principles, and the bridling of the indi-
vidual will of the magistrate by formalized rules of procedure-these
must inevitably be lessened as freer play is given to administrative dis-
cretion.
The basic dissimilarity between judicial and administrative power in
the common-law world was underlined by the well-known attempt by the
British Committee on Ministers' Powers to distinguish between "judi-
cial" and "administrative" decisions. A judicial decision was said by the
Committee to presuppose an existing dispute between two or more parties
and to involve four requisites: (1) the presentation of their case by the
parties to the dispute; (2) the ascertainment of questions of fact by
means of evidence adduced by the parties; (3) the submission of legal
argument on questions of law; and (4) a decision that disposes of the
whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of
the law of the land to the facts so found.'
An administrative decision is something entirely different. Indeed,
asserted the Committee, the very word "decision" has a different mean-
ing in the one sphere of activity than in the other.
In the case of the administrative decision, there is no legal
obligation upon the person charged with the duty of reaching
the decision to consider and weigh submissions and arguments,
or to collate any evidence, or to solve any issue. The grounds
upon which he acts, and the means which he takes to inform
himself before acting, are left entirely to his discretion.6
One of the most siguificant things about the system of adminis-
trative law that has developed in this country is that it has blurred the
sharp distinction between judicial and administrative power that has here-
tofore been of such importance in our law. "The distinctive develop-
3. GREENE, LAW AND PRoGREss 20 (1944).
4. See Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 24 (1914).
5. COMhUTTEE ON MmISTERS' POWERs, REPORT, CMD. PAPER 4060, at 73 (1932).
6. Id. at 81.
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ment of our era," said Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in an oft-quoted
passage,
is that the activities of the people are largely controlled by gov-
ernment bureaus in State and Nation. It has been well said
that this multiplication of administrative bodies with large
powers has raised anew for our law, after three centuries, the
problem of 'executive justice'; perhaps better styled 'adminis-
trative justice.' A host of controversies as to private rights
are no longer decided in courts.'
If we refer back to the distinction made by the Committee on Minis-
ters' Powers between "judicial" and "administrative" decisions, there
appears to be little doubt that many of the agencies referred to by Chief
Justice Hughes are vested with the authority to render truly judicial de-
cisions. From an analytical point of view, in fact, the powers of deci-
sion conferred upon many federal agencies could easily have been vested
in the courts. Thus, a proceeding for a reparation order by a shipper
against a carrier before the Interstate Commerce Commission cannot be
distinguished logically from a suit for damages brought in a court. Nor
can the cease and desist power of an agency like the Federal Trade Com-
mission be differentiated in its legal effect from the injunctive authority
traditionally exercised by courts of equity. In these, and a whole host
of other cases, the administrative agency is vested with judicial power
just as are the ordinary courts of justice.
II. REASONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Once we concede, as we must, that administrative agencies are en-
dowed with true judicial power, then we are confronted with the basic
problem of the place of administrative justice in our legal system. As a
starting point, it seems clear that the vesting of judicial power in agen-
cies, rather than courts, does some violence to our basic conceptions.
"That government officials . . . should themselves assume to perform
the functions of a law court and determine the rights of individuals, as
is the case under a system of administrative justice, has been tradi-
tionally felt to be inconsistent with the supremacy of law."8
Under the now-classic definition of A. V. Dicey, the doctrine of the
supremacy of law means "that no man . . . can be lawfully made to
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931, p. 18, col. 1.
S. DICKINsON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 33 (1927).
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in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land."9
This principle
is overridden by a procedure under which a man may have his
property destroyed by a health officer, or a railroad be ordered
to decrease its rates by a utilities commission, or an employer be
compelled to pay compensation to an injured employee by an
industrial-accident board. For these bodies are not 'ordinary
courts' in Dicey's sense. 'Judicial' as their functions clearly
seem to be, they are not 'courts' in the common-law meaning of
the term. And they differ from common-law courts in pre-
cisely the particulars which furnish the reasons for the common
law's insistence that every individual shall be entitled to have
his rights tried in a law court.1"
If the conferring of judicial power on agencies other than the courts
runs counter to Anglo-American traditions, why is it that such power
has been vested in such agencies rather than in the courts? And, in some
ways even more pertinent for the purposes of this paper, are the reasons
which impelled the Congress to confer judicial authority upon adminis-
trative agencies instead of courts still valid?
Of the various reasons which have influenced the Congress to dele-
gate to administrative agencies judicial power similar to that normally
exercised by the courts, perhaps the most important have been the sup-
posed inadequacies of the judicial process in dealing with regulatory
problems. The courts were widely felt to be ineffective as instruments
for the enforcement of many of the new legislative policies which have
found expression in modern regulatory statutes. Thus, there is little
doubt that one of the chief reasons for the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887 was the inadequacy of existing common-
law methods to deal with the abuses then prevalent in the railroad
industry.
In part, the asserted inadequacies of the courts were seen to result
from the inherent nature of the judicial process which prevented the
courts from playing more than the role of impartial arbiters between con-
flicting parties, rather than that of both policeman and judge, as was felt
to be necessary for effective implementation of the new regulatory
schemes. Even more influential, however, has been the widespread feel-
ing that the individualistic bent of the judges and the common-law sys-
tem developed by them rendered the courts ill-fitted to carry out the
9. DicEy, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188 (9th ed. 1939).
10. DICKINSON, oP. cit. cupra note 8, at 35.
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new regulatory laws so as to give full effect to the legislative intent to
bring important elements of the economic and social system under the
fostering guardianship of the state. Judicial subservience to an obsolete
body of rigid legal doctrine was said to result in a "traditional lack of
sympathy [on the part of the judiciary] with the positive aims of modern
government,"" and this, in turn, made it most undesirable for laws seek-
ing to give effect to such aims to be left to the courts for implementation.
This feeling has led the legislator, in many cases, to choose the adminis-
trative rather than the judicial machinery.
One of the great difficulties with the courts, according to the advo-
cates of administrative justice, arises from the costly and cumbersome
procedures employed by them. Judicial justice, they assert, is both ex-
pensive and time-consuming. The cost of going to law constitutes a
strong deterrent to the average citizen with a grievance. Added to this is
the great delay involved in litigation; judicial justice is dispensed ever so
slowly, though it may be dispensed exceedingly well.
These difficulties, it has been claimed, are avoided by vesting judi-
cial power in administrative agencies instead of courts. The administra-
tive agency, composed of experts and able to devote its exclusive atten-
tion to its particular specialized field, could avoid the technicalities which
are popularly associated with "the law's delays." "A cheap and speedy
forum is intended to be made available through administrative agencies
to those whose circumstances and immediate needs might be ill-served by
extensive litigation of a traditional type."" The supposed ability of the
agencies to avoid the expense and delay inherent in litigation in the
courts has been a major consideration in inducing the legislator to select
the administrative rather than the judicial forum since the beginning of
our administrative law. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, asserted
Mr. LaFollette during the Congressional debates, "every citizen of the
United States is given the right to present his grievance and have his case
tried without the attendant cost which now practically closes the courts
to him.""
III. CURRENT VALIDITY OF REASONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
Judicial Inadequacy. It is no longer accurate, in this country at
least, to speak of the courts as hostile to effective implementation of
regulatory laws. Such hostility there may well have been half a century
11. CoMxITzE ON MINISTERS' POWERS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE at 52 (1932)
(Testimony of W. A. Robson).
12. GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 7 (4th
ed. 1960).
13. Quoted in CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 48 (1941).
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ago; but today, if anything, the judicial pendulum, especially in the fed-
eral courts, appears to have swung to the other extreme. To presuppose
an inherent "judicial lag" in cases involving changing social and economic
conditions is to betray a basic ignorance of the method of judicial em-
piricism developed over the centuries in the common-law world.
It is a mistake to assume that law must inevitably lag behind the
other social sciences. The opposition between law and government, the
subordination of administration to law, which may have hindered Ameri-
can legislative experiments during the past century are not inherent in
judicial justice. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in an analysis of decisions such
as Ives v. South Buffalo Ry."4 and Adkins v. Childre-s Hospital,5 has
shown that the results reached were due to the judicial choice of certain
starting points.'" Not an inveterate antipathy between law and govern-
ment, but the influence of the nineteenth-century individualist ethic up-
on which the thinking of these judges was based was responsible for
which starting point was chosen. Judicial justice is not always too slow
in responding to changes in the environment in which it operates. Nor is
the growing point of law invariably in legislation. Most fundamental
changes in our legal system have, indeed, been the work of our courts.
"The infusion of morals into the law through the development of equity
was not an achievement of legislation, it was the work of courts. The
absorption of the usages of merchants into the law was not brought about
by statutes but by judicial decisions." 7
The development of an American common law-the creation of a
body of judicially declared principles suitable to America out of the old
English cases and statutes"--was almost wholly of judicial handiwork.
Where was the claimed "judicial lag" when the vision of John Marshall
was helping to mold a confederation of separate states into a united na-
tion, or when the English courts, under the leadership of Lord Mans-
field, were fusing the principles of common law, equity, and law mer-
chant into a modern legal system?
The backwardness of some of our courts with respect to social
problems during the past century, which some assert to be inherent in
judicial justice, was thus only a temporary phase based upon the per-
sistence in the judicial mind of a temporary individualist philosophy.
The remedy for this deficiency is not to withdraw the problems growing
out of present-day government from the sphere of the judicial process.
14. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
15. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
16. CARDoZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 71-74 (1924).
17. PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CommoN LAW 184 (1921).
18. See Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLum. L. REv. 103, 113 (1914).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The infusion into the judicial philosophy of modern social and economic
ideas is already furnishing new premises to enable our courts to deal
constructively with the issues arising from the changing role of the state.
When once the current of juristic thought and judicial decision
is turned into the new course our Anglo-American method of
judicial empiricism has always proved adequate. Given new
premises, our common law has the means of developing them to
meet the exigencies of justice and of molding the results into a
scientific system.'
Cost and Delay. Over half a century's experience with the adminis-
trative process in operation has proven the claim of its proponents that
it would realize the basic goal of every legal system-that of dispensing
speedy and inexpensive justice-to be more or less a will-o'-the-wisp.
Every study that has been made of the actual working of the federal
regulatory agencies has complained of the cumbersome and overtechnical
nature of administrative justice. Thus, according to the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Administrative Procedure, "the administrative agen-
cies have frequently failed to provide a speedy forum, unhampered by
burdensome delays. Lengthy hearings and incredibly voluminous records,
sometimes running into tens of thousands of pages, have been phenomena
not rare in the administrative process."2" And, in 1949, the first Hoover
Commission noted its concern "with the growth of cumbersome and
costly administrative procedures." "Administrative justice today," as-
serted the Commission, "unfortunately is not characterized by economy,
simplicity, and dispatch."'"
Nor has the situation improved since the time when the first Hoover
Commission reported. On April 29, 1953, the President called a Con-
ference on Administrative Procedure to consider "unnecessary delay, ex-
pense and volume of records" in administrative proceedings. The Con-
ference itself, in its very first recommendation to the agencies-which it
termed "the underlying philosophical declaration by the Conference"-
called for the elimination of unnecessary delay and expense in agency
proceedings,22 and the Second Hoover Commission Report speaks in a
similar vein.2"
19. POUND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 184-85.
20. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT at 61
(1941).
21. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, REPORT ON THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS at 10, 11 (1949).
22. PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT at 66, 13
(1955).
23. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE at 63-64 (1955).
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That the administrative process has not, in fact, provided the cheap
and speedy justice which was one of the principal factors motivating the
Congress to vest judicial authority upon agencies instead of courts seems
but too obvious. According to the Second Hoover Commission Report,
there are all too many examples of unreasonable delay in the federal ad-
ministrative process.
Cases before the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate
Commerce Commission are reported as averaging about 21
months. The Commission's Bureau of Finance reports pro-
ceedings lasting 1 year. The National Labor Relations Board,
on the average, requires 1 year for the disposition of unfair
labor practice cases and 6 months for representation cases.
Proceedings before the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors In-
surance of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
and before the Veterans' Education Appeals Board average 4
months and 1 year, respectively. The Subversive Activities
Control Board reports 2 years as the average time for an ad-
judicatory proceeding before that agency. One of the worst
examples of delay . . . occurs in the Indian Claim Commission,
where in five case dockets (Nos. 327, 328, 332, 196, and 330)
petitions have been filed and proceedings have been pending
since at least August 10, 1951, without any answer by the
Government more than 3 years later.2"
These examples are purely factual and can hardly be disputed by
even the most inveterate critic of the report, and those familiar with the
situation know that similar examples can be found in the work of many
other federal agencies. It is unrealistic today to contrast cheap and ex-
peditious administrative justice with the costly and cumbersome justice
dispensed by the courts. If anything, the shoe is now on the other foot.
So marked, indeed, has this become that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has recently found it desirable in one
branch of its work to resort to the Federal courts for the trial
of its cases and the invocation of the sanctions provided by
statute; utilization of the administrative hearing has been found
to be slower and more expensive, and, according to this agency's
experience, far less in the way of proof and record are neces-
sary to obtain relief in the courts than before the agency itself.
While peculiarities of subject matter and surrounding circum-
24. Ibid.
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stance limit the significance of this instance, it is nevertheless
suggestive of shortcomings in the administrative process.2"
Administrative justice in slow motion is a most shocking thing,
especially if one bears in mind that the administrative decision is not the
last word upon the matter. The decision of the agency rendered years
after the filing of the complaint must then run the gantlet of judicial re-
view which may itself take years, involving, as it may, recourse to two
and even three courts before the matter is finally resolved. Justice ren-
dered under those conditions may and often does prove illusory; a sys-
tem in which Jarndyce v. Jarndyce may become the normal type of deci-
sion stands in need of drastic overhauling.
IV. CONCENTRATION OF POWERS
If the doctrine of the separation of powers were a "doctrinaire con-
cept to be made use of with pedantic rigor,"2 the rise of the modern ad-
ministrative agency would have been an impossibility in our law, for the
outstanding characteristic of such agency is the possession by it of powers
which are both legislative and judicial in nature. The important federal
commissions are vested, on the one hand, with the authority to promul-
gate rules and regulations having the force of law and, on the other, with
the power to render decisions adversely affecting the person or property
of particular individuals. The powers so vested in these agencies are
comparable to those traditionally exercised by the Congress and the
courts. They have, however, been vested in organs outside the legisla-
tive and judicial branches because it has been felt that without such
powers they could not effectively perform the manifold regulatory tasks
entrusted to them by the legislature.
"If in private life we were to organize a unit for the operation of
an industry, it would [hardly] follow Montesquieu's lines,"2 nor can
the regulation of industry demanded by modern public opinion be ade-
quately carried out under a rigid separation of powers. The commis-
sions have consequently been made the repositories of all three types of
governmental power. In the administrative process, the various stages
of making and applying law, traditionally separate, have been telescoped
into a single agency. As Justice Jackson well put it in 1954, administra-
tive agencies today "combine delegated rule-making, the investigation and
25. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT at
61 (1941).
26. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, 3., dissent-
ing).
27. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10 (1938).
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prosecution of complaints, and adjudication, and are supposed to unite
congressional judgment as to policy, executive efficiency in enforce-
ment, and judicial neutrality and detachment of decision."2  Legislative
and judicial powers have become the chief weapons in the twentieth-
century administrative armory.
Even at this late date there are those who deny that in a system such
as ours, dominated by the doctrine of the separation of powers, any gov-
ernmental organ outside the Congress or the courts can exercise legisla-
tive or judicial authority. Such constitutional purism is wholly out of
line with the facts of contemporary governmental life. In the recent
words of Justice Douglas:
There is no doubt that the agency which determines that a par-
ticular individual or company should be brought within the
regulatory reach of the law is a lawmaking authority. It is, in
other words, clear that the administrator who by order, by rule,
or by regulation extends the civil or criminal sanctions of the
law to named parties indulges in legislating.29
The constitutional purist may claim that this sort of authority ex-
ercised by the administrator is, at most, only quasi-legislative in nature.
Certainly, to soften a legal term by a "quasi" is a time-honored lawyer's
device. Yet, in this case, it has become wholly illogical to grant the fact
of the legislative power of the commissions and still to deny the name.
When the Supreme Court in 1952 upholds an indictment of a trucker for
violation of a regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission prescribing certain compulsory safety precautions for trucks
transporting inflammables or explosives," perhaps the ICC regulation is
only a quasi-law. 1 But when the trucker is convicted of violating such
regulations, we may be certain that they do not incarcerate him in a
quasi-cell. To be sure, if we think of the separation of powers as carry-
ing out the distinction between legislation and administration with mathe-
matical precision and as dividing the branches of government into water-
tight compartments,2 we would probably have to conclude that any exer-
cise of lawmaking authority by an administrative agency is automatically
28. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AmERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
44-45 (1955).
29. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 163 (1956).
30. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
31. According to United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957), such an adminis-
trative regulation is to be treated as a "law" under a statute making it unlawful to
violate a "law of the State."
32. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
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invalid. In actuality, such a rigorous application of the constitutional
doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible; the only absolute separation
that has ever been possible was that in the theoretical writings of a
Montesquieu, who looked across at foggy England from his sunny Gas-
con vineyards, and completely misconstrued what he saw.33
The need for effective regulation has thus led to the merger in the
one regulatory agency of what are essentially legislative, executive, and
judicial functions. By concentrating these functions within the one com-
mission, the legislator has felt there can then be performed the con-
tinuous policing function essential to effective regulation. Such con-
centration enables the one agency itself to administer all the different
phases of a regulatory scheme-from the promulgation of the regulatory
prescriptions, to the policing of the field of regulation to ensure that they
are observed, to the prosecution of those who violate them, to the ad-
judication of cases brought against such violators.
In these cases, the agency concerned is both policeman, prosecutor,
and judge. But here is the great paradox of the administrative agency-
one that presents a well-nigh insoluble problem. The great weakness of
the independent regulatory agency to a student of public administration is
that it is a hybrid organism, set up to perform basically incompatible
functions, whose very incompatibility makes it impossible for them to
be performed properly. The agency is vested with the positive duty of
implementing its enabling act, usually laid down in broad and general
(or even "skeleton") terms, by the exercise of powers of rule-making
and by administering its provisions. Especially significant in this re-
spect is the affirmative duty imposed upon most of these bodies them-
selves to ensure that the terms of the enabling act are in fact complied
with and to ferret out violators. These are basically executive functions,
and the effectiveness with which they are exercised must, of necessity,
have repercussions, often drastic, upon the policy and program of the
President at the head of the executive branch of the Government.
The very independence of these agencies is such, however, as almost
inevitably to hamper the effective execution of the President's policies
and program in the fields committed to them. A new President may
thus, for example, desire to relax or make more stringent the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. But his policy in either direction may be
thwarted if the majority of the Federal Trade Commission is committed
to a contrary policy followed by the prior President. It is true, as the
Task Force on Regulatory Commissions of the first Hoover Commis-
33. Compare 1 L] VY-ULLMAN, LE SYSTkME JURIDIQUE DE L'ANGLETERRE 376 (1928).
274
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
sion pointed out,3" that the problem of co-ordination with the Executive
varies among the different commissions. Still it cannot be denied that
the problem does exist and that, in the case of some of these agencies
(notably the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board), it can be a most
serious one.
Why not then, one might ask, remove from these agencies their in-
dependent character and place them within the structure of the executive
branch, subject to the complete hierarchical control of the President?
Such a general solution is precluded by the fact that most of the federal
agencies, in addition to their functions of implementing and administer-
ing their enabling legislation, which are essentially executive in nature,
are vested with the duty of deciding cases in which alleged violators of
the legislation are proceeded against. This latter duty is basically judicial
in nature-that of trying defendants brought before the bar of justice
(administrative rather than judicial justice, it is true, but that does not
change the primarily judicial nature of the function). The exercise of
a function of this type is one which under Anglo-American concepts is
deemed to be best exercised in an atmosphere of independence rather
than as part and parcel of the very process of execution of the laws ex-
posed to all of the political pressures which play upon the political
branches of government. Hence, the independence of these agencies
from the Chief Executive was underlined by the Supreme Court in the
famous case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States." But the pur-
pose of securing truly independent judicial determinations is subverted by
the possession by the agencies of the executive functions referred to
above. They cannot be expected to decide cases before them with that
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge" of which Burke speaks when it is
they who have instituted the proceedings against the private party and
they who have the burden of presenting the case against him.
The key to the problem of the independent administrative agency is
thus the merger in it of administrative and judicial duties-not only be-
cause such merger militates against proper exercise of the role of quasi-
judge but, just as significant, because it prevents the administrative work
of the agencies from being effectively co-ordinated into the policy and
program of the executive branch as a whole. The problem resides in the
combination of functions. Any attempt at solution which does not hinge
upon an effort to mitigate the difficulties flowing from such concentra-
tion must prove illusory. This is the great weakness of the Administra-
34. CoMMsIsSSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GovERN-
MIENT, TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS at 26 (1949).
35. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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tive Procedure Act sections dealing with the problem. They adopt the
palliative of partial separation, which is inadequate to resolve the prob-
lem of proper exercise of judicial functions, and which does nothing
about the equally important problem of effective exercise of administra-
tive functions. An adequate solution of the problem must have two aims
in view: (1) ensuring that the administrative functions of the agencies
will be exercised in co-ordination with the policy and program of the Ad-
ministration; and (2) ensuring that their judicial functions will be ex-
ercised in a truly judicial manner, uninfluenced by the possession of in-
consistent functions of investigation and prosecution.
It is only the complete separation of administrative from judicial
functions that can achieve these aims. Only by such separation can both
the administrative and the judicial functions of these agencies be per-
formed properly. Most lawyers have emphasized the need of separation
for proper exercise of the role of quasi-judge. Just as important, how-
ever, is the fact that the concentration of functions impedes the effec-
tive execution of the administrative duties entrusted to the federal
agencies.
V. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To speak of governmental institutions as endowed with life is more
than a mere metaphor. The political body, like the animal, has its period
of vigor and decline. Students of the administrative commissions have
called attention to what they have called the "life cycle" of these agen-
cies." According to them, each of the federal commissions has experi-
enced roughly similar periods of growth, maturity, and decline. From
this point of view, the commissions today may be said to exhibit many
of the symptoms of old age-if not senility. When a governmental
agency becomes afflicted with administrative arteriosclerosis, the vital
spark goes out of it, just as it would out of an afflicted individual.
The current crisis in the commissions arises from the fact that these
agencies have for some years been disproving many of the basic assump-
tions which led to their creation. A more difficult matter, however,
than that of analyzing the present inadequacies of our administrative
agencies is that of proposing specific solutions for the resolution of our
difficulties.
In this connection, there is an instructive historical parallel between
the situation facing us today and that faced by sixteenth and seventeenth
century Englishmen. It is well to remember that the problem of admin-
36. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
Chapter 3 (1955).
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istrative justice is not an entirely new one in our law. Once before in
Anglo-American history the legal system was faced with the problems
posed by drastically changing economic conditions. In England at the
end of the Middle Ages the social and economic fetters that had bound
man for centuries were suddenly being unshackled. During this period
of rapid transformation, the inadequacies of existing legal institutions
were met by the creation of a host of executive tribunals to dispense jus-
tice that accorded with the felt needs of the time. The most important
of these were the Star Chamber and Chancery.
The movement away from the common law in Tudor and Stuart
times was a movement from judicial justice administered in law courts
to justice administered in what were, to all intents and purposes, adminis-
trative tribunals." And the ensuing struggle by the common law to re-
establish its supremacy has interesting implications for our own day.
A lawyer, who regards the matter from an exclusively legal
point of view, is tempted to assert that the real subject in dis-
pute between statesmen such as Bacon and Wentworth on the
one hand, and Coke or Eliot on the other, was whether a strong
administration of the continental type should, or should not,
be permanently established in England. Bacon and men like
him no doubt underrated the risk that an increase in the power
of the Crown should lead to the establishment of despotism.
But advocates of the prerogative did not (it may be supposed)
intend to sacrifice the liberties or invade the ordinary private
rights of citizens; they were struck with the evils flowing from
the conservative legalism of Coke, and with the necessity for
enabling the Crown as head of the nation to cope with the
selfishness of powerful individuals and classes. They wished,
in short, to give the government the sort of rights conferred on
a foreign executive by the principles of administrative law.38
When the common lawyers eventually triumphed after the final ex-
pulsion of the Stuarts they did not, it should be noted, attempt to turn
the legal clock back to pre-Tudor times. Instead, they sought to retain
what was desirable in the administrative justice of their day and to fit it
into its proper place in the legal order. The Star Chamber was abolished;
but the law courts themselves realized that a large part of its work was
of permanent value, and so much of its law passed into the common law.3"
37. See Pound, Jhstice According to Law, 14 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 19 (1914).
38. DIcEY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 370.
39. See PLUCKNETT, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 406 (2d ed. 1936).
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And, insofar as Chancery was concerned, its place in the legal system
was definitely confirmed. "The danger of Equity turning into the serv-
ant of despotism had passed away, and English statesmen, many of them
lawyers, were little likely to destroy a body of law which, if in one sense
an anomaly, was productive of beneficial reforms."'
Chancery was retained as a separate tribunal, but it was wholly judi-
cialized along common-law lines. Thus the Lord Chancellor, who, as
Chief Justice Vanderbilt has pointed out, "was originally, as his name
implies, the chief clerk of the king and dealt out administrative justice
in the king's name,"'" became, in time, the head of a true court, with its
established place in the existing legal order. Thus, "although Coke lost
in his quarrel with the Court of Chancery . . .Chancery was made over
gradually along common law lines. The equity made in the Court of
Chancery and the law as to misdemeanors made in the Star Chamber be-
came parts of our legal system; it is not too much to say they became
parts of the common law."42
The significance of the historical development just described for
our own day and age was well put by Chief Justice Vanderbilt over f if-
teen years ago:
Maitland, in his Rede lecture, has shown how the common law-
yers of the sixteenth century met the challenge of another body
of administrative law, in Chancery, in the Star Chamber and
in the Privy-Council-and to the great advantage of the com-
mon law. Then, as now, the administration of the common law
left much to be desired. Then, as now, what was needed was
more administration in the courts of justice and more of the
fundamental principles of justice in the administrative tribunals.
The common lawyers of the sixteenth century met their prob-
lems and mastered them. The challenge of today is so clear
that it does not need to be stated. The only question is can we
meet it.?"
The challenge of administrative justice in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries was met in our law by the elimination of the undesirable
elements in such justice and the retention and judicialization of the rest.
The arbitrary discretion exercised by the tribunals dispensing such jus-
40. DicaY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 381.
41. Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 366, 66 A.2d 726,
731 (1949).
42. Pound, supra note 37, at 21.
43. Vanderbilt, The Place of the Administrative Tribunal it; Our Legal System,
24 A.B.A.J. 267, 273 (1938).
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tice was canalized within legal limits, and where such discretion was, as
in the case of Star Chamber, too intimate a part of the tribunal, the tri-
bunal itself was done away with. The common lawyers who had earlier
complained that the justice administered by Chancery was so uncontrolled
by legal principles that it might just as well have depended upon the size
of the particular Chancellor's foot were able to ensure that Chancery
became a true court for the application of principles which, though dif-
ferent from those of the common law, were no less fixed.
The ideal development of our administrative law would be for it to
follow the pattern of the executive tribunals of three centuries ago. The
justice dispensed by the great federal agencies must become truly judicial-
ized and administered by bodies possessing solely judicial authority.
Such bodies will, in time, follow the example of Chancery and develop
into courts. Our administrative law will then become as much a part of
our ordinary law as did our law of equity after Lord Nottingham.
The starting point for this development in our law could be the giv-
ing of effect to the proposal made in 1937 by the President's Committee
on Administrative Management for the complete segregation of adminis-
trative from judicial functions in the independent federal agencies. The
Committee's proposal was that agencies with judicial functions should
be divided into an administrative section and a judicial section. The
administrative section would be designed "to formulate rules, initiate
action, investigate complaints . . . [to] do all the purely administrative
or sub-legislative work now done by the commissions-in short, all the
work which is not essentially judicial in nature." The judicial section
would "sit as an impartial independent body to make decisions affecting
the public interest and private rights."4
The Committee's proposal involves, in effect, the abolition of the
independent administrative agencies as we have known them. Both the
administrative and judicial sections into which those agencies would be
divided would be set up within the appropriate executive department.
The administrative section would be organized as a regular bureau or
division. The judicial section would, on the contrary, be in the depart-
ment only for "housekeeping purposes" and would, in fact, be wholly
independent.
There seems to be little doubt that if this proposal were followed
the judicial sections contemplated by it would and should eventually de-
velop into courts. Such has been the common historical development of
tribunals endowed only with judicial authority, though they may have
44. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT at 41-42
(1937).
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started as purely executive agencies. This is what happened, as we have
seen, with Chancery. But equity in England has not been unique in this
respect. Its development duplicated the experience of the Roman law
many centuries earlier, and more recently a similar development has oc-
curred in the judicialization of the Conseil d'Etat in the French legal sys-
tem.45 In our system today there is the suggestive experience of the Tax
Court which began some years ago as the Board of Tax Appeals-an ex-
ecutive tribunal-which has undergone the process of judicialization in
our own lifetime.
For our administrative law to duplicate the experience of the com-
mon law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it would thus have
to go through two stages: (1) the separation of judicial and adminis-
trative functions in the federal agencies and the placing of the former
in an appropriate number of independent tribunals; and (2) the judiciali-
zation of these tribunals into true courts.
It will immediately be objected that the development suggested will
result in anything but a symmetrical judicial system. The multiplication
of courts envisaged cannot help but confuse the judicial structure. It
should not necessarily be assumed, however, that the evolution of the
separate administrative courts will be the ultimate stage. On the con-
trary, it is entirely probable that those courts themselves will eventually
coalesce into a single court. "Legal history," as Dean Pound has put it,
"shows the general course of development to be a setting up of a multi-
tude of specialized tribunals, and then a gradual consolidation of them
into a simple unified system."4  The ultimate stage could thus be the
establishment of an administrative court which would exercise the judi-
cial functions now vested in the federal regulatory agencies.4"
VI. CONCLUSION
Such a drastic proposal has, not unnaturally, met with strong criti-
cism from proponents of the present system. The objections, however,
lose sight of the extreme nature of the crisis that has occurred in the
federal agencies in recent years. Those who propose palliatives for the
present administrative system may, in fact, do more harm than good
in the long run. If their measures are adopted, they will give the illusion
45. See ScHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE CoMMoN-LAw WORLD
1-18 (1954).
46. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 331,
355 (1938).
47. The Second Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure
recommends the setting up of such Administrative Court at the present time. REPORT
at 249-50 (1955).
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of safeguards which are really facades. Commissions composed of men
who are insulated by neither the tenure nor the traditions of the judiciary
cannot really be expected to act with true independence in the public in-
terest. To retain the essentials of the present system and still remedy its
inherent defects is as chimeric a task as the squaring of the circle.
If, in Madison's famous phrase, men were angels, perhaps we would
not have to concern ourselves with the proper functioning of political in-
stitutions. Yet, even of this we cannot be certain, for does not Bacon tell
us that it was the desire of power that caused even the angels to fall? In
a government of men over men, the only safe assumption is constant
scrutiny to ensure that public bodies are in fact fulfilling the purposes
for which they were instituted. We need not necessarily agree with
Lord Acton that great men are almost always bad men, but our govern-
mental structure and system of checks and balances must clearly be based
upon some such assumption. In fact, our whole constitutional structure
has been erected upon the assumption that the king not only is capable of
doing wrong, but is more likely to do wrong than other men if given the
chance. We must not today depart from the judgment of our ancestors
and judge those in possession of governmental power with the presump-
tion that they can do no wrong. On the contrary, if there is any pre-
sumption, it should be the other way-against the holders of power and
increasing as the power increases. In the field of administrative law,
historic responsibility can never make up for the want of legal responsi-
bility and safeguards.
